Congratulations from European leaders to US President-elect Donald Trump are flowing like champagne, as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was planning to celebrate. Those on the nationalist and Eurosceptic end of the political spectrum feel energized; those on the left are certainly tweeting through gritted teeth. In France, the United States’ oldest ally, the mood is contradictory: President Emmanuel Macron’s tweet in English offering to “work together” with Trump was followed by a tweet in French stridently promising a stronger, more united Europe.

However, no amount of whispering about Trump changes the fact that the Old Continent seems woefully helpless in the face of the brewing geopolitical storm. A MAGA Republican White House and Congress would bring the risk of increased “America First” spending, punitive tariffs on European imports, and fights over taxes and bureaucracy in American technology (including Elon Musk’s). Trump has also put collective defense under the NATO article. 5 on notice by conditioning it to the expense; their concern is China, not Ukraine. The slow agony of Europe’s economic and productivity decline under Sino-US pressure makes it difficult to imagine a robust response, as does the soft power-led continent’s dependence on US security.

The 27 members of the European Union, along with neighbors such as the United Kingdom, face a tough choice. Leaders can adopt typical muddling through, lining up to pay homage to Trump and seek preferential treatment through deals or (more likely) concessions, prolonging the status quo of an unequal relationship with a United States increasingly He cares less about a continent. trapped in economic and demographic decline. This could offer an extension of what Francois Heisbourg of the International Institute for Strategic Studies calls les trente paresseuses: the 30-year geopolitical torpor typified by the German model of freeloading on US defense, trade with China and gas. Russian, while leaving defense spending and strategic issues. credibility withers.

Or it could seek greater assertiveness and investment — starting with defense — that would allow for better burden-sharing, more independent support for Ukraine’s quest for a “just peace,” and a more balanced relationship with Trump’s United States.

I appreciate that this type of conversation is starting to sound more like theology than reality. It has been almost a decade since Macron came to power with all kinds of promises of sovereignty and strategic autonomy; However, even today, with the largest large-scale conflict on European soil since 1945, South Korea has supplied more shells to Ukraine than all of Europe. , and Musk’s Starlink is the technological tipping point. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, once said, Europe is an American protectorate with deep economic dependence. This is not thrown away one day.

Still, there are milder signs of change afoot. Trump symbolizes a security agreement that seems less attractive for both sides: the United States’ turn towards Asia means that 100,000 of its military in Europe is no longer a no-brainer, as Trump himself has warned, while for the continentals the historically pitifully spent by On defense, countries like Germany seem a liability as Russia’s war economy turns. Hence that spending is increasing: military outlays by European NATO members will increase by $33 billion this year to $380 billion, reaching 2% of gross domestic product, with Poland being the largest individual contributor in relation to GDP. That does not indicate readiness, as the EU will need €500 billion in defense spending over the next decade. But Europe is at least ready to match Russia’s ammunition production next year.

This wake-up call comes not just from the usual suspects (ahem, France), but from Europe’s own “swing states” that once had unwavering faith in the United States. Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently tweeted that “the era of geopolitical outsourcing is over”, former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas has expressed support for joint EU defense funding and the former Prime Minister of Lithuania, Andrius Kubilius, has received the new position of European Commissioner. for defense and space. Germany’s reluctance is a key obstacle, but Friedrich Merz, favorite to be the next chancellor, has taken a strong pro-Ukraine line and is calling for EU solutions as the United States turns inward.

Crucial pieces of the puzzle are still missing. Europe has a strong defense industrial base, including companies such as Rheinmetall AG and Airbus SE, but it needs more contracts, less fragmentation and modernized procurement systems in a more technology-driven world. It also needs faster decision-making: former French and Moldovan ministers Laurence Boone and Nicu Popescu are advocating for a European version of the US Defense Production Act to speed up responses in crises. And given fiscal constraints, there are new arguments in favor of defense bonds that would increase spending, make it more efficient and foster coordination, the Center for European Reform argues.

While the transatlantic relationship has a multitude of problems, they all arise from defense: it is both a direct cause of tension because the Europeans are not pulling out all the stops and an indirect cause because it gives Trump leverage to extract concessions elsewhere. places. More defense means more autonomy, more credible geopolitics and a healthier industrial base. If the old ways win instead (and the risk of this happening is high), then the next geopolitical winter will be incredibly cold.

Disclaimer: This article first appeared on Bloomberg and is published under a special distribution agreement.