If we didn’t know any better, we might flip through the newspaper and conclude that the international order that the United States helped build after World War II was falling apart. We could also be led to believe that four countries, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, are not only contributing to its demise but are also forming an alliance to destroy the so-called rules-based order that top US officials boast about. .

Since war broke out in Ukraine in February 2022, US foreign policy experts have used the word “axis” to describe the burgeoning relations between Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang. Some refer to the block as an “axis of agitation”; and others frame it as an “axis of revisionist powers” ​​or the more verbose “axis of growing evil associations.” Even the phrase “axis of evil,” which President George W. Bush famously cited during his 2002 State of the Union address, is reappearing in popular discourse.

But is any of that true? Is this “axis” framing correct? Or is the United States dealing with a set of adversary states whose interests are currently temporarily aligned?

Yes, cooperation is indeed occurring between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. They may be very different countries with different languages, cultures and history, but all four view the United States as a hostile adversary. The United States has sanctioned Iran and North Korea to the core, and the sanctions have only intensified in recent years. China sees the United States as its main competitor and a country seeking to corral allies to contain Chinese power and development. Russia, of course, has even bigger complaints; If not for more than $60 billion in U.S. military aid, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s troops would likely be in a more advantageous position in Ukraine than they are today.

But we should not exaggerate the similarities and ignore the nuances. What the United States and its allies face is not so much an “axis” per se, but rather a temporal alignment that is shallower than it appears.

Take for example the relationship between Russia and North Korea, which is making headlines right now. According to officials from the United States, South Korea and Ukraine, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has deployed approximately 12,000 of his troops to Russia, where they are receiving training before being sent to the Kursk region to fight the ongoing Ukrainian offensive. At first glance, this seems like a big problem: one country, North Korea, is putting its citizens in danger on behalf of another, Russia. The deployment comes four months after Kim and Putin signed a comprehensive partnership agreement that requires both to defend each other if either is attacked or invaded.

However, even this dramatic development is driven by pragmatism. Kim is not lending thousands of North Koreans to Russia out of the goodness of his heart or because he believes the Kremlin’s narrative that Ukraine is an artificial creation. He’s doing this because, presumably, Russia will pay back North Korea in the future. In fact, Pyongyang appears to be reaping some benefits from its investment in the form of food aid, energy assistance, support on the United Nations Security Council, and military technology transfers that could enhance Pyongyang’s satellite program. For example, Russia in the spring canceled an extension of a U.N. panel monitoring sanctions on North Korea.

The cost-benefit ratio is currently in favor of North Korea.

What about ties between China and Russia? Even before the war in Ukraine, relations between these two former antagonists were improving considerably. Russian and Chinese delegations have frequently joined forces in the Security Council to hinder or block US initiatives. The Russian and Chinese militaries exercise each other more regularly and sometimes even poke the United States in the eye: in July, the US Air Force intercepted some Russian and Chinese bomber planes operating in the Air Defense Identification Zone from Alaska. Of most concern to President Joe Biden’s administration is that China continues to serve as a lifeline for the Russian economy and the Russian war effort, as Beijing receives discounted oil from Moscow and exports dual-use items, such as microchips, that could return to be used in the army. systems.

But even the strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow has its limits, despite what Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Putin may claim to the contrary. While there is no doubt that Russia would be in a much worse situation if not for China’s support (Secretary of State Antony Blinken said as much in April), Beijing is careful not to put all its eggs in the Russian basket.

The last thing Xi wants to do at a time when the Chinese economy is starting to slow is to jeopardize relations with the West, which remains China’s largest trading partner. Russia, whose trade with China reached a record $240 billion last year, simply cannot compete with the US and European Union markets.

Geopolitically, China is likely not particularly happy with Russia’s closer relationship with North Korea. Beijing is accustomed to being the predominant external power agent vis-à-vis the North and its goal above all is to maintain balance and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The same cannot be said for Russia, whose appetite for risk is now greater than before. As the war in Ukraine continues, greater US focus on East Asia works for Russia. Not so with China.

International politics is too complicated for clear binaries.

Daniel DePetris is a Defense Priorities fellow and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.